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Game-Theoretic Design of Secure and Resilient Distributed Support Vector Machines
with Adversaries
Rui Zhang and Quanyan Zhu
Abstract—With a large number of sensors and control units
in networked systems, distributed support vector machines
(DSVMs) play a fundamental role in scalable and efficient multi-
sensor classification and prediction tasks. However, DSVMs are
vulnerable to adversaries who can modify and generate data
to deceive the system to misclassification and misprediction. This
work aims to design defense strategies for DSVM learner against
a potential adversary. We establish a game-theoretic framework
to capture the conflicting interests between the DSVM learner
and the attacker. The Nash equilibrium of the game allows
predicting the outcome of learning algorithms in adversarial
environments, and enhancing the resilience of the machine
learning through dynamic distributed learning algorithms. We
show that the DSVM learner is less vulnerable when he uses a
balanced network with fewer nodes and higher degree. We also
show that adding more training samples is an efficient defense
strategy against an attacker. We present secure and resilient
DSVM algorithms with verification method and rejection method,
and show their resiliency against adversary with numerical
experiments.
I. INTRODUCTION
Support Vector Machines (SVMs) have been widely used
in multi-sensor data fusion problems, such as motor fault
detection [2], land cover classification [3], and gas prediction
[4]. In these applications, a fusion center is required to collect
data from each sensor and train the SVM classifier. However,
the computations in the fusion center and its communications
with sensors become costly when the size of data and network
becomes large [5].
To solve the large-scale data fusion problems, several meth-
ods have been developed to speed up SVMs. For example, in
[6], Tsang et al. have introduced an approximation method
to scale up SVMs. In [7], Dong et al. have presented an
efficient SVM algorithm using parallel optimization. These
methods only speed up the computations in the fusion center,
but the data transmissions between fusion center and sensors
still require a significant amount of time and channel usages.
Efficiency is not the only drawback of the centralized SVM
using fusion center. Sensors that collect sensitive or private
information to design the classifier may not be willing to share
their training data [8]. Moreover, a compromised fusion center
attacked by an adversary may give erroneous information to all
the sensors in the network. Furthermore, compromised sensors
may also provide misleading information to the fusion center,
and consequently affect uncompromised sensors [9].
Distributed support vector machines (DSVMs) draw at-
tentions recently as it does not require a fusion center to
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process data collections and computations [8], [10], [11].
Each node in the network solves decentralized sub-problems
themselves using their own data, and only a small amount of
data is transferred between nodes, which makes DSVMs more
efficient and private than the centralized counterpart.
However, DSVMs are also vulnerable. For example, mis-
leading information can be spread to the whole network, and
the large number of nodes and complex connections in a
network makes it harder to detect and track the source of the
incorrect information [12]. Moreover, even though we can find
the compromised nodes, an adversary can attack other nodes
and spread misleading information.
Thus, it is important to design secure and resilient dis-
tributed support vector machines algorithms against potential
attacks from an adversary. In this paper, we focus on a consen-
sus based DSVM algorithm where SVM problem is captured
by a set of decentralized convex optimization sub-problems
with consensus constraints on their decision variables [1], [8].
We aim to design defense strategies against potential attacks
by analyzing the equilibrium of the game-theoretic model
between a DSVM learner and an attacker.
In our previous work [1], we have built a game-theoretic
framework to capture the conflict of interests between the
DSVM learner and the attacker who can modify the training
data. In the two-person nonzero-sum game, the learner aims
to decentralize the computations over a network of nodes and
minimize the error with an effort to minimize misclassification,
while the attacker seeks to modify strategically the training
data and maximize the error constrained by its computational
capabilities.
The game formulation of the security problem enables a
formal analysis of the impact of the DSVM algorithm in adver-
sarial environments. The Nash equilibrium of the game enables
the prediction of the outcome, and yields an optimal response
strategy to the adversary behaviors. The game framework also
provides a theoretic basis for developing dynamic learning
algorithms that will enhance the security and the resilience
of DSVMs.
In this paper, we propose several defense strategies for
a DSVM learner against a potential attacker, and we show
the effectiveness of our defense strategies using numerical
experiments. The major contributions of this work are multi-
fold.
Firstly, we capture the attacker’s objective and constrained
capabilities in a game-theoretic framework, and develop a
nonzero-sum game to model the strategic interactions between
an attacker and a learner with a set of nodes. We then fully
characterize the Nash equilibrium by showing the strategic
equivalence between the original nonzerosum game and a
zero-sum game.
2Secondly, we develop secure and resilient distributed al-
gorithms based on alternating direction method of multipliers
(ADMoM) [13]. Each node communicates with its neighboring
nodes, and updates its decision strategically in response to
adversarial environments. We present a summary of numerical
results in [1].
Lastly, we present four defense strategies against poten-
tial attackers. The first defense strategy is to use balanced
networks with fewer nodes and higher degrees. In the sec-
ond defense strategy, we show that adding training samples
to compromised nodes can reduce the vulnerability of the
learning system. Adding samples to uncompromised nodes
at the beginning of the training process also makes the
learner less vulnerable. The third defense strategy is to use
verification method where each node verifies its received data,
and only accepts reasonable information from neighboring
nodes to prevent misleading or illegitimate information sent
to uncompromised nodes. The fourth defense strategy is to
use rejection method where each node rejects unacceptable
updates. Thus, not only misleading information is kept from
affecting uncompromised nodes, but also wrong updates could
be prevented in compromised nodes.
A. Related Works
Our work intersects the research areas on data fusion, ma-
chine learning, cyber security and machine learning. Machine
learning tools have been used to tackle data fusion problems,
e.g., [14]–[16]. However, machine learning systems can be
insecure [17]. For example, in [18], Huang et al. have shown
that SpamBayes and PCA-based network anomaly detection
are vulnerable to causative attacks. In [19], Biggio et al. have
shown that popular classification algorithms can be evaded
even if the attacker has limited knowledge of learner’s system.
With distributed machine learning tools developed for solv-
ing large-scale multi-sensor data fusion problems, each sensor
solves sub-problems themselves and transmits information
with neighboring sensors [20]. However, cyber security be-
comes another problem as an attacker may launch malicious
cyber attacks to the data fusion networks [21]. Thus, it is
important for the machine learning learner to analyze the
equilibrium of the game with an adversary and design defense
strategies against potential attacks.
Game theory is a natural tool to address this problem. It has
been used in the study of the security of machine learning.
For example, in [22], Liu et al. have modeled the interaction
between a learner and an attacker as a two-person sequential
noncooperative Stackelberg game. In [23], Kantarcioglu et al.
have used game theory to analyze the equilibrium behavior of
adversarial learning.
Game theory has also been used widely in cyber security
as it provides mathematical tools for modeling situations of
conflicts and predicting the behaviors of the attacker and
defender in network security [24], [25]. For example, in [26],
Shen et al. have built an adaptive Markov game model to
infer possible cyber attack patterns. In [27], Jiang et al. have
presented an attack prediction and optimal active defense
method using a stochastic game.
With game theory, we are able to analyze the game between
a distributed machine learning learner with an adversary
in a network, and further design defense strategies for the
learner against the attacker. In our work, we focus on a
class of consensus-based distributed support vector machines
algorithms [8]. We assume that the attacker has the ability to
modify training data to achieve his objectives.
In our previous works [1], [28], [29], we have built a game-
theoretic model to capture the conflicts between a DSVM
learner and an adversary who can modify training data or
labels, and we have solved the game-theoretic problem with
ADMoM [13]. In this work, we further analyze the equilibrium
behaviors, and design defense strategies for DSVMs against
potential attacks. We use numerical experiments to verify the
effectiveness of our strategies.
B. Organization of the Paper
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
2 outlines the consensus-based distributed support vector
machines. In Section 3, we establish game-theoretic models
for the learner and the attacker. Section 4 deals with the
distributed and dynamic algorithms for the learner and the
attacker. Section 5 summarizes our previous numerical exper-
iments. Section 6 presents four different defense strategies and
their corresponding numerical experiments. Section 7 provides
conclusion remarks.
C. Summary of Notations
Notations in this paper are summarized as follows. Boldface
letters are used for matrices (column vectors); (·)T denotes
matrix and vector transposition; (·)(t) denotes values at step
t; [·]vu denotes the vu-th entry of a matrix; diag(X) is the
diagonal matrix with X on its main diagonal; ‖ · ‖ is the
norm of the matrix or vector; V denotes the set of nodes in
a network; Bv denotes the set of neighboring nodes of node
v; U denotes the action set used by the attacker.
II. DISTRIBUTED SUPPORT VECTOR MACHINES
In this section, we present a distributed support vector
machines learner in the network modeled by an undirected
graph G (V ,E ) with V := {1, ...,V} representing the set of
nodes, and E representing the set of links between nodes.
Node v ∈ V communicates only with his neighboring nodes
Bv ⊆ V . Note that without loss of generality, graph G is
assumed to be connected; in other words, any two nodes in
graph G are connected by a path. However, nodes in G do
not have to be fully connected, which means that nodes are
not required to directly connect to all the other nodes in the
network. The network can contain cycles. At every node v∈V ,
a labelled training set Dv := {(xvn,yvn) : n= 1, ...,Nv} of size
Nv is available, where xvn ∈ R
p represents a p-dimensional
pattern, and they are divided into two groups with labels
yvn ∈ {+1,−1}. Examples of a network of distributed nodes
are illustrated in Fig. 1(a).
The goal of the learner is to design DSVM algorithms
for each node in the network based on its local training
3(a) Network example.
(b) SVMs at node 1.
Fig. 1. Network example. (a) There are 7 nodes in this network. (b) Each
node contains a labelled training set Dv := {(xvn,yvn) : n = 1, ...,Nv}. Each
node can communicate with its neighbors. In each node, the learner aims to
find the best linear discriminant line (Black solid line).
data Dv, so that each node has the ability to give new
input x a label of +1 or −1 without communicating Dv
to other nodes v′ 6= v. To achieve this, the learner aims
to find local maximum-margin linear discriminant functions
gv(x) = x
Tw∗v + b
∗
v at every node v ∈ V with the consensus
constraints w∗1 = w
∗
2 = · · ·= w
∗
V ,b
∗
1 = b
∗
2 = · · ·= b
∗
V , forcing all
the local variables {w∗v,b
∗
v} to agree across neighboring nodes.
Variables w∗v and b
∗
v of the local discriminant functions gv(x)
can be obtained by solving the following convex optimization
problem [8]:
min
{wv,bv,{ξvn}}
1
2 ∑
v∈V
‖wv‖
2
2+VCl ∑
v∈V
Nv
∑
n=1
ξvn
s.t.
yvn(w
T
v xvn+ bv)≥ 1− ξvn, ∀v ∈ V ,n= 1, ...,Nv;
ξvn ≥ 0, ∀v ∈ V ,n= 1, ...,Nv;
wv = wu,bv = bu, ∀v ∈ V ,u ∈ Bv.
(1)
In the above problem, slack variables ξvn account for non-
linearly separable training sets. Cl is a tunable positive scalar
for the learner.
To solve Problem (1), we first define rv := [w
T
v ,bv]
T , the
augmented matrix Xv := [(xv1, ...,xvNv)
T ,1v], the diagonal label
matrix Yv := diag([yv1, ...,yvNv ]), and the vector of slack
variables ξv := [ξv1, ....,ξvNv ]
T . With these definitions, it fol-
lows readily that wv = (Ip+1 − Πp+1)rv, where Πp+1 is a
(p+1)× (p+1) matrix with zeros everywhere except for the
(p+ 1, p+ 1)-st entry, given by [Πp+1](p+1)(p+1) = 1. Thus,
Algorithm 1: ADMoM-DSVM
Randomly initialize r
(0)
v ,λ
(0)
v ,ω
(0)
vu and α
(0)
v = 0(p+1)×1.
1: for t = 0,1,2, ... do
2: for all v ∈ V do
3: Compute λ
(t+1)
v via (3).
4: Compute r
(t+1)
v via (4).
5: end for
6: for all v ∈ V do
7: Broadcast r
(t+1)
v to all neighbors u ∈Bv.
8: end for
9: for all v ∈ V do
10: Compute ω
(t+1)
vu via (5).
11: Compute α
(t+1)
v via (6).
12: end for
13: end for
Problem (1) can be rewritten as
min
{rv,ξv,ωvu}
1
2 ∑
v∈V
rTv (Ip+1−Πp+1)rv+VCl ∑
v∈V
1Tv ξv
s.t.
YvXvrv ≥ 1v− ξv,
ξv ≥ 0v,
rv = ωvu,ωvu = ru,
∀v ∈ V ;
∀v ∈ V ;
∀v ∈ V ,∀u ∈ Bv.
(2a)
(2b)
(2c)
(2)
Note that ωvu is used to decompose the decision variable rv to
its neighbors ru, where u∈Bv. Problem (2) is a min-problem
with matrix form coming from Problem (1).
With alternating direction method of multipliers [13], Prob-
lem (2) can be solved distributed in the following lemma [8],
Lemma 1. With arbitrary initialization r
(0)
v ,λ
(0)
v ,ω
(0)
vu and
α
(0)
v = 0(p+1)×1, the iterations per node are given by:
λ
(t+1)
v ∈ arg max
0≤λv≤VCl1v
− 1
2
λ Tv YvXvU
−1
v X
T
v Yvλv
+(1v+YvXvU
−1
v f
(t)
v )
T
λv,
(3)
r
(t+1)
v = U
−1
v
(
XTv Yvλ
(t+1)
v − f
(t)
v
)
, (4)
ω
(t+1)
vu =
1
2
(r
(t+1)
v + r
(t+1)
u ), (5)
α
(t+1)
v = α
(t)
v +
η
2
∑
u∈Bv
[
r
(t+1)
v − r
(t+1)
u
]
, (6)
where Uv = (Ip+1 − Πp+1) + 2η |Bv|Ip+1, f
(t)
v = 2α
(t)
v −
2η ∑u∈Uv ω
(t)
vu .
The proof of Lemma 1 can be found in [8]. Iteration (3)
is a quadratic programming problem. λv are the Lagrange
multipliers per node corresponding to constraint (2a). Iteration
(4) computes the decision variables rv, note that the inverse
of Uv always exists and easy to solve. Iteration (5) yields
the consensus variables ωvu. Iteration (6) computes αv, e.g.,
the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the consensus con-
straint (2c). Iterations (3)-(6) are summarized into Algorithm
1. Note that at any given iteration t of the algorithm, each node
v∈ V computes its own local discriminant function g
(t)
v (x) for
any vector x as
g
(t)
v (x) = [x
T ,1]r
(t)
v . (7)
4Algorithm 1 solves the DSVM problem using ADMoM
technique. It is a fully decentralized network operation, and
it does not require exchanging training data or the value of
decision functions, which meets the reduced communication
overhead and privacy preservation requirements at the same
time. However, information transmitted in the network not
only helps improve the performance of each node, but also
increases the damages from the attacker, as the misleading
information can be spread to every node. To design a secure
and resilient DSVM algorithm, we first build the attack model
to capture the attacker’s intentions of breaking the training
process of the learner.
III. DISTRIBUTED SUPPORT VECTOR MACHINES WITH
ADVERSARY
In this section, we present the game-theoretic framework
of a DSVM learner and an attacker who takes over a set of
nodes with the aim of breaking the training process of the
learner. We assume that the attacker has a complete knowledge
of the learner’s Problem (1) by Kerckhoffs’s principle: the
enemy knows the system [30], which enables us to anticipate
the interactions of the learner and the attacker in a worst-
case scenario. Moreover, the attacker can easily acquire the
complete knowledge of the learning systems in reality, for
example, by node capture attacks [31] and computer worms
[32], an attacker can compromise the whole network through
connections between neighboring nodes, and thus obtain the
private and sensitive information of the learner.
To achieve the malicious goal, the attacker takes over a set
of nodes Va := {1, ...,Va} and changes xvn into
x̂vn = xvn− δvn,
where δvn ∈ Uv, and Uv is the attacker’s action set at node v.
Note that we use Vl = {1, ...,Vl} to represent nodes without
the attacker. V = Va +Vl and V = Vl ∪ Va. A node in the
network is either under attack or not under attack. An example
of the impact of the attacker on the learner is shown in Fig. 2.
This type of attacks represents a challenge for the learner. On
the one hand, the learner will find the incorrect classifiers at
the compromised nodes, and communications in the network
may lead to unanticipated results as misleading information
from compromised nodes can be spread to and then used
by uncompromised nodes. On the other hand, it is difficult
for the learner to identify modified data, and furthermore, in
distributed settings, the learner may not even be able to detect
which nodes are under attack. Potential real world examples
of the attackers are discussed as follows.
Example 1 (Air pollution detection) [33]. Consider an air
pollution detection system which uses DSVM as the classifiers
to determine whether certain areas have air pollution. An
attacker can modify the training data of the certain areas to let
the system fail to recognize the air pollution. Moreover, the
attacker can even modify other areas’ training data to achieve
his goal, since misleading information can be spread among
the whole system by the communications between neighboring
nodes. However, with a large amount of training data and
areas, the learner will fail to detect the compromised data and
(a) Network under attack.
(b) SVMs at compromised node 1.
Fig. 2. Network with attacker. (a) Node 1 and 4 are under attack. (b) In
compromised node, for example, node 1, an attacker modifies the training
data which leads to a wrong linear discriminant line (Black dotted line).
areas, and the results of the air pollution detection system will
be untrustworthy.
Example 2 (Distributed medical databases) [8]. Suppose
several medical centers aim to find classifiers together on
a certain disease using DSVM. An attacker can modify the
training data of one medical center, which affects not only
the compromised medical center, but also the uncompromised
medical centers, as the misleading information can be spread
among the network. As a result, all the medical centers might
give inaccurate diagnosis on the disease. To find out the
compromised training data, the learner is required to examine
all the training data from all the medical centers, which is
costly and sometimes even unrealistic.
Now Problem (1) changes to,
min
{wv,bv,{ξvn}}
1
2 ∑
v∈V
‖wv‖
2
2+VCl ∑
v∈V
Nv
∑
n=1
ξvn
s.t.
yvn(w
T
v xvn+ bv)≥ 1− ξvn,
yvn(w
T
v x̂vn+ bv)≥ 1− ξvn,
ξvn ≥ 0,
wv = wu,bv = bu,
∀v ∈ Vl ,n= 1, ...,Nv;
∀v ∈ Va,n= 1, ...,Nv;
∀v ∈ V ,n= 1, ...,Nv;
∀v ∈ V ,u ∈ Bv.
(8)
By minimizing the objective function in Problem (8), the
learner can obtain the optimal variables {wv,bv}, which can
be used to build up the discriminant function to classify the
testing data. The attacker, on the other hand, aims to find
5an optimal way to modify the data using variables {δvn} to
maximize the same objective function. The behavior of the
attacker can thus be captured as follows:
max
{δvn}
1
2 ∑
v∈V
‖wv‖
2
2+VCl ∑
v∈V
Nv
∑
n=1
ξvn−Ca ∑
v∈Va
Nv
∑
n=1
‖δvn‖0
s.t.
yvn(w
T
v xvn+ bv)≥ 1− ξvn,
yvn(w
T
v (xvn− δvn)+ bv)≥ 1− ξvn,
ξvn ≥ 0,
wv = wu,bv = bu,
δvn ∈ Uv,
∀v ∈ Vl ,n= 1, ...,Nv;
∀v ∈ Va,n= 1, ...,Nv;
∀v ∈ V ,n= 1, ...,Nv;
∀v ∈ V ,u ∈ Bv;
∀v ∈ Va.
(9)
In above problem, the term Ca ∑v∈Va ∑
Nv
n=1‖δvn‖0 represents
the cost function for the attacker. l0 norm is defined as ‖x‖0 :=
|{i : xi 6= 0}|, i.e., a total number of nonzero elements in a
vector. Here, we use the l0 norm to denote the number of
elements which are changed by the attacker. The objective
function with l0-norm captures the fact that the attacker aims
to make the largest impact on the learner by changing the least
number of elements. Constraint δvn ∈ Uv indicates the action
set of the attacker. In this paper, we use the following form
of Uv:
Uv =
{
(δv1, ...,δvNv )
∣∣∣∣∣ Nv∑
n=1
‖δvn‖
2
2 ≤Cv,δ
}
,
which is related to the atomic action set Uv0 ={
δv
∣∣∣‖δv‖22 ≤Cv,δ }. Cv,δ indicates the bound of the sum
of the norm of all the changes at node v. A higher Cv,δ
indicates that the attacker has a large degree of freedom in
changing the value xvn. Thus training these data will lead
to a higher risk for the learner. Notice that Cv,δ can vary at
different nodes, and we use Cδ to represent the situation when
Cv,δ are equal at every node. δv ∈ R
p from the atomic action
set has the same form with δvn, but δv and (δv1, ...,δvNv ) are
bounded by same Cv,δ . Furthermore, the atomic action set
Uv0 has the following properties [34].
(P1) 0 ∈Uv0;
(P2) For any w0 ∈ R
p :
max
δv∈Uv0
[
wT0 δv
]
= max
δ ′v∈Uv0
[
−wT0 δ
′
v
]
<+∞.
The first property (P1) states that the attacker cannot choose
to change the value of xvn. Property (P2) states that the atomic
action set is bounded and symmetric. Here, “bounded” means
that the attacker has the limit on the capability of changing
xvn. It is reasonable since changing the value significantly will
result in the evident detection of the learner.
For the learner, the learning process is to find the dis-
criminant function which separates the training data into two
classes with less error, and then use the discriminant function
to classify testing data. Since the attacker has the ability to
change the value of original data xvn ∈ X into x̂vn ∈ X̂ , the
learner will find the discriminant function that separates the
data in X̂ more accurate, rather than the data in X . As a
result, when using the discriminant function to classify the
testing data x ∈ X , it will be prone to be misclassified.
Since the learner aims at a high classification accuracy,
while the attacker seeks to lower the accuracy, we can capture
the conflicting goals of the players as a two-person nonzero-
sum game by combining Problem (8) and Problem (9) to-
gether. The solution to the game problem is described by
Nash equilibrium, which yields the equilibrium strategies for
both players, and predicts the outcome of machine learning
in the adversarial environment. By comparing Problem (8)
with Problem (9), we notice that they contain the same terms
in their objective functions and the constraints in the two
problems are uncoupled. As a result, the nonzero-sum game
can be reformulated into a zero-sum game, which takes the
minimax or max-min form as follows:
min
{wv,bv,{ξvn}}
max
{δvn}
1
2 ∑
v∈V
‖wv‖
2
2+VCl ∑
v∈V
Nv
∑
n=1
ξvn
−Ca ∑
v∈Va
Nv
∑
n=1
‖δvn‖0
s.t.
yvn(w
T
v xvn+ bv)≥ 1− ξvn,
yvn(w
T
v (xvn− δvn)+ bv)≥ 1− ξvn,
ξvn ≥ 0,
wv = wu,bv = bu,
δvn ∈ Uv,
∀v ∈ Vl ,n= 1, ...,Nv;
∀v ∈ Va,n= 1, ...,Nv;
∀v ∈ V ,n= 1, ...,Nv;
∀v ∈ V ,u ∈ Bv;
∀v ∈ Va.
(10)
Note that the first and fourth constraints only contribute to
the minimization part of the problem, the fifth constraint only
affects the maximization part. The second and third constraints
contribute to both the minimization and the maximization part.
The first term of the objective function is the inverse of the
distance of margin. The second term is the sum of all the
slack variables which captures the error penalties. On one
hand, minimizing the objective function captures the trade-
off between a larger margin and a small error penalty of the
learner, while on the other hand, maximizing the objective
function captures the trade-off between a large error penalty
and a small cost of the attacker. As a result, solving Problem
(10) can be understood as finding the saddle-point equilibrium
of the zero-sum game between the attacker and the learner.
Definition 1. Let SL and SA be the action sets for the DSVM
learner and the attacker, respectively. Notice that here SA =
{Uv}v∈Va . Then, the strategy pair ({w
∗
v ,b
∗
v,{ξ
∗
vn}} ,{δ
∗
vn})
is a saddle-point equilibrium solution of the zero-sum
game defined by the triple Gz := 〈{L,A} ,{SL,SA} ,K〉,
if K ({w∗v,b
∗
v ,{ξ
∗
vn}} ,{δvn}) ≤ K ({w
∗
v ,b
∗
v,{ξ
∗
vn}} ,{δ
∗
vn}) ≤
K ({wv,bv,{ξvn}} ,{δ
∗
vn}) ,∀v ∈ V , where K is the objective
function of Problem (10).
Based on the property of the action set and atomic action
set, Problem (10) can be further simplified as stated in the
following lemma [1].
Lemma 2. Assume that Uv is an action set with corresponding
atomic action set Uv0. Then, Problem (10) is equivalent to the
6following optimization problem:
min
{wv,bv,{ξvn}}
max
{δv}
1
2 ∑
v∈V
‖wv‖
2
2+VCl ∑
v∈V
Nv
∑
n=1
ξvn
+ ∑
v∈Va
(
VaClw
T
v δv−Ca‖δv‖0
)
s.t.
yvn(w
T
v xvn+ bv)≥ 1− ξvn,
ξvn ≥ 0,
wv = wu,bv = bu,
δv ∈ Uv0,
∀v ∈ V ,n = 1, ...,Nv;
∀v ∈ V ,n = 1, ...,Nv;
∀v ∈ V ,u ∈Bv;
∀v ∈ Va.
(11)
Proof. See Appendix A.
In Problem (10), the second and third constraints are the
coupled terms with the second term of the objective function.
But in Problem (11), the only coupled term is VaClw
T
v δv,
which is linear in the decision variables of the attacker and
the learner, respectively.
IV. ADMOM-DSVM AND DISTRIBUTED ALGORITHM
In the previous section, we have combined Problem (8) for
the learner with Problem (9) for the attacker into one minimax
Problem (10), and have showed its equivalence to Problem
(11). In this section, we develop iterative algorithms to find
equilibrium solutions to Problem (11). Using a similar method
in Section II, Problem (11) can be rewritten into matrix form
as
min
{rv,ξv,ωvu}
max
{δv}
1
2 ∑
v∈V
rTv (Ip+1−Πp+1)rv+VCl ∑
v∈V
1Tv ξv
+ ∑
v∈Va
(
VaClr
T
v (Ip+1−Πp+1)δv−Ca‖δv‖0
)
s.t.
YvXvrv ≥ 1v− ξv,
ξv ≥ 0v,
rv = ωvu,ωvu = ru,
δv ∈ Uv0,
∀v ∈ V ;
∀v ∈ V ;
∀v ∈ V ,∀u ∈ Bv;
∀v ∈ Va.
(12a)
(12b)
(12c)
(12d)
(12)
To solve problem (12), we use best response dynamics to
construct the best response for the min-problem and max-
problem separately. The min-problem and max-problem are
archived by fixing {δv} and {rv}, respectively. With ADMoM
[35], we can develop a method of solving Problem (12) in a
distributed way as follows: The first step is that each node
randomly picks an initial r
(0)
v ,δ
(0)
v and αv = 0(p+1)×1, then
solve the max-problem with {r
(0)
v }, and obtain{δ
(1)
v }. The
next step is to solve the min-problem with {δ
(1)
v } and obtain
{r
(1)
v }, then we repeat solving the max-problem with {rv}
from the previous step and the min-problem with {δv} from
the previous step until the pair {rv,δv} achieves convergence.
The iterations of solving Problem (12) can be summarized as
follows [1].
Lemma 3. With arbitrary initialization δ
(0)
v ,r
(0)
v ,λ
(0)
v ,ω
(0)
vu
and α
(0)
v = 0(p+1)×1, the iterations per node are given by:
δ
(t+1)
v ∈ arg max
{δv,sv}
VaClr
(t)T
v (Ip+1−Πp+1)δv
− 1T sv
s.t.
Caδv ≤ sv,
Caδv ≥−sv,
δv ∈ Uv0,
∀v ∈ Va;
∀v ∈ Va;
∀v ∈ Va.
(13)
λ
(t+1)
v ∈ arg max
0≤λv≤VCl1v
− 1
2
λ Tv YvXvU
−1
v X
T
v Yvλv
+(1v+YvXvU
−1
v f
(t)
v )
T
λv,
(14)
r
(t+1)
v = U
−1
v
(
XTv Yvλ
(t+1)
v − f
(t)
v
)
, (15)
ω
(t+1)
vu =
1
2
(r
(t+1)
v + r
(t+1)
u ), (16)
α
(t+1)
v = α
(t)
v +
η
2
∑
u∈Bv
[
r
(t+1)
v − r
(t+1)
u
]
, (17)
where Uv = (Ip+1 − Πp+1) + 2η |Bv|Ip+1, f
(t)
v = VaClδ
(t)
v +
2α
(t)
v − 2η ∑u∈Uv ω
(t)
vu .
Proof. See Appendix B.
Iterations (13) corresponds to the attacker’s Max-Problem
(9), while iterations (14)-(17) corresponds to the learner’s
Min-Problem (8). The Minimax Problem (11) is solved by
iterating them together. Note that, iterations (14)-(17) differ
from iterations (3)-(6) only in fv. In (14)-(17), fv adds another
term VaClδv which captures the attacker’s impact on the
learner. Iterations (13)-(17) are summarized into Algorithm
2.
Algorithm 2: DSVM under attack
Randomly initialize δ
(0)
v ,r
(0)
v ,λ
(0)
v ,ω
(0)
vu and α
(0)
v = 0(p+1)×1.
1: for t = 0,1,2, ... do
2: for all v ∈ V do
3: Compute δ
(t+1)
v via (13).
4: end for
5: for all v ∈ V do
6: Compute λ
(t+1)
v via (14).
7: Compute r
(t+1)
v via (15).
8: end for
9: for all v ∈ V do
10: Broadcast r
(t+1)
v to all neighbors u ∈Bv.
11: end for
12: for all v ∈ V do
13: Compute ω
(t+1)
vu via (16).
14: Compute α
(t+1)
v via (17).
15: end for
16: end for
Algorithm 2 solves the Minimax Problem (11) using AD-
MoM technique. It is a fully distributed algorithm which only
requires transmitting rv between each nodes. The attacker’s
behavior is captured as calculating δv by solving the linear
programming Problem (13) with the learner’s decision variable
rv. The learner’s behavior is captured as computing (14)-(17)
7with δv from the attacker. Since the learner transmits rv to each
neighboring nodes, misleading information will eventually
spread in the whole network, which leads to misclassifications
in all nodes.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we summarize numerical results of DSVM
under adversarial environments. We use empirical risk to
measure the performance of DSVM. The empirical risk at node
v at step t is defined as follows:
R
(t)
v :=
1
N˜v
N˜v
∑
n=1
1
2
∣∣∣y˜vn− ŷ(t)vn ∣∣∣, (18)
where y˜vn is the true label; ŷ
(t)
vn is the predicted label; and
N˜v represents the number of testing samples in node v. The
empirical risk (18) sums over the number of misclassified
samples in node v, and then divides it by the number of
all testing samples in node v. Notice that testing samples
can vary for different nodes. In order to measure the global
performance, we use the global empirical risk defined as
follows:
R
(t)
G :=
1
N˜
∑
v∈V
N˜v
∑
n=1
1
2
∣∣∣y˜vn− ŷ(t)vn ∣∣∣, (19)
where N˜ = ∑
v∈V
N˜v, representing the total number of testing
samples. Clearly, a higher global empirical risk shows that
there are more testing samples being misclassified, i.e., a
worse performance of DSVM. We use the first experiment
to illustrate the significant impact of the attacker.
Consider a network with 3 nodes, which can be seen at
the bottom right corner of Fig. 3(a). Each node contains 80
training samples and 1000 testing samples from the same
global training dataset, which is shown as points and stars
in Fig. 3(a). Yellow stars and magenta points are labelled
as −1 and +1, respectively. They are generated from two-
dimensional Gaussian distributions with mean vectors [1,1]
and [3,3], with the same covariance matrix [1,0;0,1]. The
learner has the ability Cl = 1 and η = 1. The attacker has the
atomic action set parameter C1,δ = 9,000,000, and the cost
parameter Ca = 1. The attacker only attacks Node 1 which is
shown as red points at the bottom right corner in Fig. 3(a)
and attack starts from the beginning of the training process.
Numerical results are shown in Fig. 3(b). Notice that the risks
when there is an attacker are much higher than the risks when
there is no attacker, which indicates that the attacker has a
significant impact on the learner. Also, we can conclude that
the risks at the node under attack are much higher than the
risks in nodes without attack, but both of them are higher than
the risks when there is no attacker in the network. This shows
that the attacker has the ability to affect uncompromised nodes
through network connections. We can also observe from Fig.
3(a) that the solid lines, which represent the situation when
there is an attacker, cannot separate yellow stars and magenta
points.
It is clear that the attacker can cause disastrous results for
the learner. In our previous work [1], we have shown that
(a)
(b)
Fig. 3. Evolution of the empirical risks of ADMoM-DSVM with the attacker
at a network with 3 nodes shown at the bottom right corner of figure (a). An
attacker only attacks red node 1 from the beginning of the training process.
Training data and testing data are generated from two Gaussian classes. Dotted
lines and solid lines show the results when there is no attacker and there is
an attacker, respectively. Different colors represent risks or discriminant lines
of different nodes.
results of the game between the DSVM learner and the attacker
are affected by both the attacker’s ability and the network
topologies. We summarize our previous numerical results from
[1] in the following observations.
Observation 1. The attacker’s ability is captured by four
measures, i.e., (i) the time t for the attacker to take an
action, (ii) the atomic action set parameter Cv,δ , (iii) the cost
parameter Ca, and (iv) the number of compromised nodes |Va|.
The impact of them is summarized as follows.
• The time t for an attacker to take an action does not affect
the equilibrium risks.
• A larger Cv,δ increases the equilibrium risk, as a larger
Cv,δ indicates that the attacker can make a larger modi-
fication on training data.
• A larger Ca decreases the equilibrium risk, as a larger
Ca restricts the attacker’s actions to make changes.
• A larger number of compromised nodes |Va| increases
the equilibrium risk as attacking more nodes gives the
attacker access to modify more training samples.
Observation 2. Denote the degree of node v as |Bv | /(| V |
−1) and the degree of a network as the average degree of all
the nodes. The impact of network topologies are summarized
as follows.
• Networks with higher degrees and fewer nodes are less
8vulnerable to attacker.
• Balanced networks, i.e., nodes in these networks have the
same number of neighboring nodes, are more secure than
unbalanced networks.
Notice that here we assume that each node in the network
contains the same number of samples.
Observation 3. For a specified network, assuming that all
the nodes contain the same number of samples, the impact of
a node is summarized as follows.
• Nodes with higher degrees are more vulnerable, i.e.,
attacking nodes with higher degrees leads to a higher
global equilibrium risk.
• Attacking nodes with lower degrees can lead to a higher
global equilibrium risk if the network contains nodes
with higher degrees, comparing to networks without high
degree nodes but has the same average degree.
Observations 1, 2 and 3 summarize our previous numerical
experiments in [1]. From Observation 1, the attacker makes a
larger impact when he has a higher capability, such as, he has
a larger Cv,δ and a smaller Ca, or he can attack more nodes.
From Observation 2, on the one hand, the attacker can choose
to attack unbalanced networks with lower degrees and more
nodes to make a more significant impact on the learner, on the
other hand, the learner should select balanced networks with
higher degrees and fewer nodes to reduce potential damages
from attacker. From Observation 3, the attacker benefits more
from attacking nodes with higher degrees, while the learner
should avoid using high degree nodes. These observations
provide both players the strategies to make a larger impact
on the other ones. In the following subsections, we present in
detail how the attacker and the learner can find better strategies
against each other.
A. Attacker’s Strategies
Consider that a DSVM learner operates training data on
an unbalanced network. We assume that the attacker knows
the learner’s algorithm and the network topology. We also
assume that the attacker has the ability to attack any nodes
in this network with ∑
Va
v=1Cv,δ ≤ CVa,δ , i.e., a total sum of
all changed values in the network should be bounded by
CVa,δ . Notice that boundedCVa,δ represents a trade-off between
attacking more nodes Va and attacking each nodes with larger
Cv,δ . Since attacking different nodes leads to different global
equilibrium risks, and the attacker tends to higher risks, there
exists an optimal strategy of selecting Va and {Cv,δ}v∈Va for
the attacker which has the highest equilibrium global risk with
a boundedCVa,δ . The optimal strategy can be found by solving
the following problem:
max
{Va,Cv,δ }
min
{wv,bv,{ξvn}}
max
{δvn}
1
2 ∑
v∈V
‖wv‖
2
2+VCl ∑
v∈V
Nv
∑
n=1
ξvn
−Ca ∑
v∈Va
Nv
∑
n=1
‖δvn‖0− ∑
v∈Va
hv
s.t.
yvn(w
T
v xvn+ bv)≥ 1− ξvn,
yvn(w
T
v (xvn− δvn)+ bv)≥ 1− ξvn,
ξvn ≥ 0,
wv = wu,bv = bu,
δvn ∈ Uv, i.e.,∑
Nv
n=1‖δvn‖
2
2 ≤Cv,δ ,
∑
Va
v=1Cv,δ ≤CVa,δ .
∀v ∈ Vl ,n= 1, ...,Nv;
∀v ∈ Va,n= 1, ...,Nv;
∀v ∈ V ,n= 1, ...,Nv;
∀v ∈ V ,u ∈ Bv;
∀v ∈ Va;
(20)
Note that Problem (20) extends Problem (10) by maxi-
mizing over variables Va and {Cv,δ } with a new constraint
∑Vav Cv,δ ≤CVa,δ that captures a bound of on attacker’s ability.
The last term hv in the objective function represents the cost
of attacking node v.
Problem (20) is based on the assumption that the attacker
has the knowledge of the learner’s algorithm and the network
topology. The learner aims to minimize the classification errors
in Problem (10), while the attacker maximizes that errors. In
Problem (20), the attacker has two components to maximize.
Maximizing over {δvn} is the same as in Problem (10).
Maximizing over Va and {Cv,δ } indicates the objective of the
attacker to maximize equilibrium risk of the original game
with a bounded CVa,δ and a cost hv. By solving Problem (20),
the attacker can find the optimal strategy of Va and {Cv,δ}v∈Va ,
which has the maximized equilibrium risk.
However, solving Problem (20) can be a challenge as the
decision variables Va and Cv,δ are coupled with the decisions
of the learner and the attacker. The attacker is still able to
make a larger impact on the learner by Observation 1, 2 and
3. For example, instead of randomly picking nodes to attack
and assigning Cv,δ , the attacker can strategically attack high
degree nodes, which leads to a higher risk from observations.
One numerical example is shown in Fig. 4.
Consider the learner operates on a network shown in Fig.
4(a). We assume that the attacker can only attack 2 nodes with
the boundCVa,δ = 2×10
8, and the cost of attacking node v, i.e.,
hv are the same for every node. A naive attacker may randomly
attack 1 node with Cv,δ = 2× 10
8. However, a smart attacker
will choose 2 nodes with higher degrees, and by modifying
the value of Cv,δ in both nodes, he can make a larger impact
on the learner. Numerical results are shown in Fig. 4(b).
From Fig. 4, the attacker has four different strategies, (i)
the attacker only attacks Node 6, (ii) the attacker only attacks
Node 1, (iii) the attacker attacks Node 1,2 with balanced
ability, and (iv) the attacker attacks Node 1,2 with unbalanced
ability. We can see that when the attacker choose Strategy
(iii), the risk is the highest. However, if we take the cost of
attacking different nodes into consideration, this strategy may
not be the best as attacking 2 nodes may cost too much. But
from the example, we can see that Observation 1, 2 and 3
provides us a way to find a better strategy for the attacker.
They also provide us tools of finding better strategies for the
learner.
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Fig. 4. Evolution of moving average of global empirical risks of ADMoM-
DSVM with the attacker on Spam dataset [36]. Each node contains 40 training
samples. Attacker has four strategies with same CVa ,δ = 2×10
8 and Ca = 0.01.
B. Learner’s Strategies
A DSVM learner aims to find the best discriminant func-
tions with the least classification errors. Since an attacker will
increase the classification errors, a better strategy of the learner
is to reduce the attacker’s impact as much as possible. In this
section, we assume that the learner is trying to find the strategy
of network topology that has a smallest risk with potential
attacks. We assume that the learner has the ability to select
any kinds of network topologies and assign any number of
training samples in each node. The learner’s strategy can be
found by solving the following problem,
min
{V ,Bv,Nv}
min
{wv,bv,{ξvn}}
max
{δvn}
1
2 ∑
v∈V
‖wv‖
2
2+VCl ∑
v∈V
Nv
∑
n=1
ξvn
−Ca ∑
v∈Va
Nv
∑
n=1
‖δvn‖0− ∑
v∈V
Tv(Nv)− ∑
v∈V
Bv(Bv)
s.t.
yvn(w
T
v xvn+ bv)≥ 1− ξvn,
yvn(w
T
v (xvn− δvn)+ bv)≥ 1− ξvn,
ξvn ≥ 0,
wv = wu,bv = bu,
δvn ∈ Uv, i.e.,∑
Nv
n=1 ‖δvn‖
2
2 ≤Cv,δ ,
∀v ∈ Vl ,n= 1, ...,Nv;
∀v ∈ Va,n= 1, ...,Nv;
∀v ∈ V ,n= 1, ...,Nv;
∀v ∈ V ,u ∈ Bv;
∀v ∈ Va.
(21)
Note that Problem (21) extends Problem (10) by minimizing
over variables V ,Bv and Nv with new costs Tv(Nv) and
Bv(Bv). Tv(Nv) represents the cost of training Nv samples in
node v, Bv(Bv) represents the cost of sending information
from node v to his neighboring nodes u ∈ Bv. Problem (21)
can be understood as the learner’s attention to minimize
equilibrium risk of the game with potential attacks by finding
the best network topology V , Bv and training samples’
assignments Nv.
Solving Problem (21) can be a challenge as V , Bv and
Nv are coupled with the decisions of the learner and the
attacker. But the learner can benefit from Observation 1, 2
and 3. For example, the learner should select a balanced
network with fewer nodes and higher degree, which has a
smaller equilibrium risk. However, in reality, the learner may
not be able to modify network topologies as the connections
between nodes can be fixed, or it may not be possible to add
connections between nodes. Thus, to reduce the impact of the
attacker, the learner requires actionable defense strategies.
In the following sections, we present four different defense
strategies, and we verify their effectiveness with numerical
experiments.
VI. DSVM DEFENSE STRATEGIES
In this section, we present four defense strategies (DSs) for
the DSVM learner. We show their effectiveness with numerical
experiments.
A. DSVM Defense Strategy 1: Selecting Network Topology
DS 1 for the learner is to find a network topology that has
a smaller risk when there is an attacker. From the last section,
the learner can find the network topology by solving Problem
(21). However, Problem (21) is difficult to solve. But we are
still able to find a secure network topology using Observation
2 and 3. The network topology should be close to a balanced
network with fewer nodes and a higher degree. A numerical
experiment is shown in Fig. 5.
Consider that a DSVM learner trains 300 samples, and he
aims to select a secure network topology from four topologies
shown in Fig. 5(a). DS 1 indicates that we should select
network A or B as network A has the smallest number of
nodes among all the networks, and network B has the highest
degree among networks B,C,D. Numerical results in Fig. 5(b)
show that DS 1 has smaller risks.
Though selecting a network with fewer nodes reduces the
vulnerability of the learner, but each node is required to train
more training samples, which takes more time and memory
usages. In addition, the learner may not have the ability to
select a proper network topology as most networks are given.
And improving the degree of the network may not be always
applicable as adding connections between nodes is costly. Thus
DS 1 is suitable for cases when the network connections are
convenient to modify.
Consider the application in which several wireless temper-
ature sensors in the building aim to decide whether to open
their air conditioners or not. Since a large building may have
hundreds of sensors and the temperatures are always changing
with time, centralized classifications may take a significant
amount of time to collect, transmit, and process the data.
DSVMs can be used here as each sensor operates on its own
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Fig. 5. Evolution of the global empirical risks of ADMoM-DSVM with
the attacker on a random dataset. The learner has four options of network
topologies which are shown in figure (a). Topology A is a balanced network
with 3 nodes and degree 1, each node in this network contains 80 training
samples. Network B is a balanced network with 6 nodes and degree 1. Network
C is a balanced network with 6 nodes and degree 0.4. Network D is an
unbalanced network with 6 nodes and degree 0.4. Each node in network B,C
and D contains 40 training samples. Attacker attacks 1 node in network A, but
he attacks 2 nodes in network B,C,D, so the attacker can modify the same
number of training samples in different network topologies. The attacker has
Cv,δ = 5×10
5 and Ca = 0.01.
data, and only a small amount of information is transmitted
between sensors. But if there is an attacker who has the
ability to modify the training data in several sensors, then the
sensors in the building will lead to wrong decisions. In this
case, wireless temperature sensors can adapt and modify their
network topology. Thus, a secure strategy here is to use DS 1
to create a balanced network with fewer sensors and a higher
average degree.
B. DSVM Defense Strategy 2: Adding Training Samples
Since the attacker is limited to making modifications on the
training data, a higher volume of training data will decrease
the ratio of incorrect data at a node. As long as most of the data
are correct, the learner can find the discriminant function with
small classification errors. Thus adding more training samples
becomes a reasonable defense strategy. Numerical experiments
are shown in Fig. 6.
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Fig. 6. Evolution of global empirical risks of ADMoM-DSVM with an
attacker at a balanced network with 6 nodes and degree 0.4 on random dataset,
which is shown in Fig. 5(a) as Network C. Each node contains 40 training
samples. Attacker only attacks node 1 with C1,δ = 10
6 and Ca = 0.01.
From Fig. 6, when we add training samples to network,
the risk is lower. Thus adding training samples is a proper
defense strategy. Note that more samples we add, the lower the
risk will be. Adding training samples to compromised nodes
turns out to be more efficient than adding to uncompromised
nodes. However, training more samples requires more time
and memory usages, which sacrifices efficiency. Thus, DS 2
is a trade-off between efficiency and security.
DS 2 is suitable for the case when the learner cannot
change the network topology, but the size of training data
is sufficiently large and each node has a strong computing
capability. For example, consider an application where several
environmental stations plan to detect whether some areas are
under pollution with a wired communication network. DSVMs
are suitable to process a large amount of data computations and
transmissions. However, if an attacker modifies the training
data, environmental stations may lead to misdetection. In this
case, DS 1 may not be applicable as the wired connections
between each station are fixed. However, since each station
can collect enough training data and has a higher computation
capability, DS 2 is more appropriate and the learner can add
more training samples to each node to make the training
process more secure. Note that using more samples requires
additional time to train and more space to store data.
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Algorithm 3: DSVM with Verification
Randomly initialize r
(0)
v ,λ
(0)
v ,ω
(0)
vu , set α
(0)
v = 0(p+1)×1,
set B̂v = Bv.
1: for t = 0,1,2, ... do
2: for all v ∈ V do
3: Compute λ
(t+1)
v via (3) with B̂v.
4: Compute r
(t+1)
v via (4) with B̂v.
5: end for
6: for all v ∈ V do
7: Broadcast r
(t+1)
v to all neighbors u ∈Bv.
8: end for
9: for all v ∈ V do
10: Set B̂v = /0.
11: for all u ∈Bv do
12: if | 1−
‖r
(t+1)
u ‖2
‖r
(t+1)
v ‖2
) |< τ
13: Set u ∈ B̂v.
14: end if
15: end for
16: end for
17: for all v ∈ V do
18: Compute ω
(t+1)
vu via (5) with B̂v.
19: Compute α
(t+1)
v via (6) with B̂v.
20: end for
21: end for
C. DSVM Defense Strategy 3: Verification Method
DS 1 suggests that the learner uses a balanced network with
fewer nodes and a higher degree. However, using fewer nodes
requires that each node trains more training samples, which
sacrifices the efficiency. Increasing the degree of the network
requires creating more connections between nodes, which are
usually not applicable as building new lines may incur a high
cost. DS 2 indicates that adding more training samples can
reduce the vulnerability of the network, which also sacrifices
the efficiency. Thus, both DS 1 and DS 2 have their limitations
on securing a training process. In this section, we present
a verification method that reduces the vulnerability without
modifying the network topology or adding training samples.
In ADMoM-DSVM Algorithm 1, each node in the network
receives ru from his neighboring nodes and it also sends
his rv to his neighboring nodes at each step. Since ru from
neighboring nodes of node v contributes to the updates of
rv, a wrong ru can lead to an incorrect update of rv. As
a result, if node v is protected from receiving wrong ru
from compromised nodes, it can have a correct discriminant
function.
Recall DSVM Problem (2), note that consensus constraints
rv = ωvu,ωvu = ru force all the local decision variables rv to
agree with each other. Thus, r
(t)
1 ≈ ... ≈ r
(t)
V should hold for
every step t during the training process. Thus, if rv violates
this, then the learner can tell that node v is under attack.
With Algorithm 1, if node v finds ru is significantly different
from rv, then he will reject using ru to update himself. We
call this method as the verification method. The ADMoM-
DSVM algorithm with verification method can be summarized
as Algorithm 3.
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Fig. 7. Evolution of the empirical risks of ADMoM-DSVM with the attacker
at a balanced network with 4 nodes degree 0.4 on random dataset. Each node
contains 60 training samples. Attacker only attacks Node 1 with C1,δ = 10
5
and Ca = 0.01. τ = 0.1.
Algorithm 3 differs from Algorithm 1 in the verification
method. Each node computes with information only from
trusted neighboring nodes u ∈ B̂v. The verification method is
based on the inequality in step 12 of Algorithm 3. τ indicates
the tolerance of indifference from ru to rv, and τ ≥ 0. When
τ is close to 0, node v is very sensitive to the information
from other nodes, and it only uses ru that is very close to rv.
Numerical experiments are shown in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8.
We can see from Fig. 7 that the global risk has decreased
when there is a verification method. Note that in uncom-
promised node 4, the risk is closed to the risk when there
is no attacker, while in compromised node 1, the risk is
higher than the risk when there is no defense. This indicates
that, though the verification method protects uncompromised
nodes from receiving misleading information, it also prevents
compromised nodes from receiving correct information.
Fig. 8 compares the global risks when the learner uses
different τ . We can see that when τ = 10, the risk is higher than
the risk when τ = 0.1, thus some of the misleading information
is still able to be spread in the network. When τ = 0.001, we
can see that the risk is even higher than the risk when there
is no defense. Also note that when there is no attacker, the
risk of DSVM with τ = 0.001 does not converge to the risk
of normal DSVM. This indicates that when τ is close to 0,
the misleading information cannot be spread to other nodes,
but the useful information is also forbidden to transmit. Thus
DS 3 requires a proper selection of τ .
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Fig. 8. Evolution of the global empirical risks of ADMoM-DSVM with the
attacker at a balanced network with 4 nodes degree 0.4 on Spambase dataset
[36]. Each node contains 60 training samples. Attacker only attacks node 1
with C1,δ = 10
6 and Ca = 0.01 .
DS 3 is suitable for the case when training data are used in
a large network. Since it is difficult for the attacker to attack
many nodes at the same time, for a network with a large
number of nodes, all the uncompromised nodes can be kept
from being affected by the compromised nodes. Moreover, the
learner can distinguish compromised nodes by their high local
classification risks, and thus, without revoking the training
process and retraining all the data in every node, the learner
is able to maintain the resilience of the training process by
deleting or correcting the compromised nodes. Comparing to
DS 1 and 2, DS 3 does not sacrifice efficiency to maintain
security, but the compromised nodes may result in worse
performances.
D. DSVM Defense Strategy 4: Rejection Method
DSs 1, 2 and 3 have shown that with selecting proper
network topologies, adding training samples and verification
method, DSVM learner can be less vulnerable to attacks.
However, DSs 1 and 2 will sacrifice efficiency. In DS 3,
compromised nodes may result in worse performances. In this
section, we present the rejection method where each node
rejects unreasonable updates. With the rejection method, once
there is an attacker, the iteration will terminate to prevent
further damages caused by the attacker.
The rejection method relies on a combined residual, which
measures both the primal and dual error simultaneously:
J(t+1) = η ∑
v∈V
∑
u∈Bv
∥∥∥ω(t+1)vu −ω(t)vu ∥∥∥2
2
+
2
η ∑
v∈V
∥∥∥α(t+1)v −α(t)v ∥∥∥2
2
.
(22)
Note that the combined residual contains two terms. The
first term measures the dual residual. The second term mea-
sures the primal residual. The combined residual has the
following lemma [37].
Lemma 4. Iterations (3)-(6) satisfy that J(t+1) ≤ J(t), which
can also be rewritten as:
η ∑
v∈V
∑
u∈Bv
∥∥∥ω(t+1)vu −ω(t)vu ∥∥∥2
2
+ 2η ∑
v∈V
∥∥∥α(t+1)v −α(t)v ∥∥∥2
2
≤ η ∑
v∈V
∑
u∈Bv
∥∥∥ω(t)vu −ω(t−1)vu ∥∥∥2
2
+ 2η ∑
v∈V
∥∥∥α(t)v −α(t−1)v ∥∥∥2
2
.
(23)
A proof of Lemma 4 can be found in [37]. Lemma 4 indi-
cates that the combined residual always decreases. Since the
attacker aims to break the training process, this inequality will
not be satisfied when there is an attacker. Note that computing
Inequality (23) requires ωvu and αv from every node, which
can be down by a fusion center in centralized machine learning
problems. However, since the learner uses a fully distributed
network without a fusion center, we decentralize Inequality
(23) into |V | distributed inequalities, for v ∈ V :
η ∑
u∈Bv
∥∥∥ω(t+1)vu −ω(t)vu ∥∥∥2
2
+ 2η
∥∥∥α(t+1)v −α(t)v ∥∥∥2
2
≤ η ∑
u∈Bv
∥∥∥ω(t)vu −ω(t−1)vu ∥∥∥2
2
+ 2η
∥∥∥α(t)v −α(t−1)v ∥∥∥2
2
.
(24)
Note that there is no guarantee that Inequality (24) holds
based on Inequality (23). As a result, we relax the distributed
inequality with a parameter ρ > 1, which is summarized in
the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Iterations (3)-(6) satisfy that J
(t+1)
v ≤ ρJ
(t)
v ,
where
J
(t)
v = η ∑
u∈Bv
∥∥∥ω(t)vu −ω(t−1)vu ∥∥∥2
2
+ 2η
∥∥∥α(t)v −α(t−1)v ∥∥∥2
2
. (25)
Proof. Let us assume that J
(t+1)
v ≤ ρJ
(t)
v does not hold for
v= v0, we have J
(t+1)
v0 > ρJ
(t)
v0 and J
(t+1)
v6=v0
≤ ρJ
(t)
v6=v0
. As a result,
J
(t+1)
v0 > ρ
(t+1)J
(0)
v0 which increases exponentially with ρ > 1.
Since J
(t)
v is always larger than 0, Inequality (23) will be
violated eventually. Proposition 1 holds.
With the inequality in Proposition 1, the new DSVM
algorithm with rejection method can be summarized into
Algorithm 4. In Algorithm 4, if the inequality at Step 15 is not
satisfied, then the update will be rejected. J
(0)
v should be set to
be sufficiently large to pass the first rejection test. Numerical
experiments are shown in Fig. 9, Fig. 10, and Fig. 11.
From Fig. 9, we can see that the DSVM algorithm with
rejection method has a lower risk than the normal algorithm
when there is an attacker. And it has the same performance
when there is no attacker, which indicates that when ρ = 1.5,
rejection method does not affect the training process. Fig.
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Algorithm 4: DSVM with Rejection
Randomly initialize r
(0)
v ,λ
(0)
v ,ω
(0)
vu and α
(0)
v = 0(p+1)×1,
set J
(0)
v very large.
1: for t = 0,1,2, ... do
2: for all v ∈ V do
3: Compute λ
(t+1)
v via (3).
4: Compute r
(t+1)
v via (4).
5: end for
6: for all v ∈ V do
7: Broadcast r
(t+1)
v to all neighbors u ∈Bv.
8: end for
9: for all v ∈ V do
10: Compute ω
(t+1)
vu via (5).
11: Compute α
(t+1)
v via (6).
12: Compute J
(t+1)
v via (25).
13: end for
14: for all v ∈ V do
15: if J
(t+1)
v > ρJ
(t)
v
16: λ
(t+1)
v = λ
(t)
v , r
(t+1)
v = r
(t)
v ,
17: α
(t+1)
v = α
(t)
v , ω
(t+1)
vu = ω
(t)
v ,
18: J
(t+1)
v = J
(t)
v .
19: end if
20: end for
21: end for
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Fig. 9. Evolution of the empirical risks of ADMoM-DSVM Rejection with
the attacker at a balanced network with 4 nodes of degree 0.4 on Spambase
dataset [36]. Each node has 60 training samples. The attacker only attacks 1
node with C1,δ = 10
5 and Ca = 0.01. The rejection method has ρ = 1.5.
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Fig. 10. Evolution of the empirical risks of ADMoM-DSVM Rejection with
the attacker at a balanced network with 4 nodes of degree 0.4 on Spambase
dataset [36]. Each node has 60 training samples. The attacker only attacks 1
node with C1,δ = 10
5 and Ca = 0.01. The rejection method has ρ = 1.
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Fig. 11. Evolution of the empirical risks of ADMoM-DSVM Rejection with
the attacker at a balanced network with 4 nodes of degree 0.4 on Spambase
dataset [36]. Each node has 60 training samples. The attacker only attacks 1
node with C1,δ = 10
5 and Ca = 0.01. The rejection method has ρ = 100.
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10 and Fig. 11 show the results when ρ = 1 and ρ = 100,
respectively. We can see from Fig. 10 that when ρ = 1, the
risk is lower when there is an attacker, but convergence slows
down when there is no attacker. We can see from Fig. 11 that
when ρ = 100, the risk with rejection method is even higher
than the risk of the standard algorithm, because wrong updates
can still be treated as a correct update and accumulates as
iteration goes.
From the numerical experiments, the value of ρ is important
to the rejection method. A smaller ρ may slow down the
convergence of the DSVM algorithm without attacker, a larger
ρ does not prevent attacks. With a properly selected ρ , the
training process becomes less vulnerable to attackers.
DS 4 is suitable for a wide range of applications as wrong
updates will be rejected. Comparing to DSs 1 and 2, DS 4
does not sacrifice efficiency. Comparing to DS 3, compromised
nodes in DS 4 has been kept from being further damaged by
the attacker. One possible drawback of DS 4 is that it may
require insights of the problem to find a proper ρ .
Each defense strategy is suitable for a different scenario and
applications. The choice of defense strategies will depend on
the applications and the constraints on the defender’s actions.
Though four defense strategies have their own advantages and
disadvantages, a combination of all the defense strategies can
be used to secure the training process of the learner.
VII. CONCLUSION
Distributed support vector machines are ubiquitous but in-
herently vulnerable to adversaries. This paper has investigated
defense strategies of DSVM against potential attackers. We
have established a game-theoretic framework to capture the
strategic interactions between an attacker and a learner with a
network of distributed nodes. We have shown that the nonzero-
sum game is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game,
and hence, its equilibrium can be characterized by a saddle-
point equilibrium solution to a minimax problem. By using
the technique of ADMoM, we have developed secure and
resilient algorithms that can respond to the adversarial envi-
ronment. We have shown that a balanced network with fewer
nodes and a higher degree is less vulnerable to the attacker.
Moreover, adding more training samples has been proved to
reduce the vulnerability of the system. We have shown that
verification method where each node verifies information from
neighboring nodes can protect uncompromised nodes from
receiving misleading information, but compromised nodes
are also prevented from receiving correct information. We
have shown that rejection method where each node rejects
unreasonable updates can stop global training process from
deterioration, thus wrong information is thwarted from affect-
ing the system. One direction of future works is to extend the
current framework to investigate nonlinear DSVM and other
machine learning algorithms.
APPENDIX A: PROOF OF LEMMA 2
A detailed proof of Lemma 2 can be found in our previ-
ous work [1]. By using hinge loss function, we reformulate
Problem (10) into the following problem:
min
{wv,bv}
max
{δvn}
1
2 ∑
v∈V
‖wv‖
2
2
+VlCl ∑
v∈Vl
Nv
∑
n=1
[
1− yvn(w
T
v xvn+ bv)
]
+
+VaCl ∑
v∈Va
Nv
∑
n=1
[
1− yvn(w
T
v (xvn− δvn)+ bv)
]
+
−Ca ∑
v∈Va
Nv
∑
n=1
‖δvn‖0
s.t.
wv = wu,bv = bu,
(δv1, ...,δvNv ) ∈ Uv,
∀v ∈ V ,u ∈Bv;
∀v ∈ Va.
(26)
Similarly, Problem (11) can be reformulated into the following
problem:
min
{wv,bv}
max
{δv}
1
2 ∑
v∈V
‖wv‖
2
+VlCl ∑
v∈Vl
Nv
∑
n=1
[
1− yvn(w
T
v xvn+ bv)
]
+
+VaCl ∑
v∈Va
Nv
∑
n=1
[
1− yvn(w
T
v xvn+ bv)
]
+
+ ∑
v∈Va
(
VaClw
T
v δv−Ca‖δv‖0
)
s.t.
wv = wu,bv = bu, ∀v ∈ V ,u ∈ Bv;
δv ∈ Uv0, ∀v ∈ Va.
(27)
As a result, we only need to prove that problem (26) is
equivalent to problem (27). Since both of problems are min-
max problems with the same variables, we only need to prove
that we minimize the same maximization problem. Moreover,
Moreover, since {δvn} is independent in the maximization
part of (26), and δv is independent in the maximization
part of (27), we can separate maximization problem into Va
sub-maximization problems, and solving the sub-problems is
equivalent to solving the global maximization problem. As a
result, we only need to show that the following sub-problem
max
{δvn}∈Uv
S({δvn})
∆
=VaCl
Nv
∑
n=1
[
1− yvn(w
T
v (xvn− δvn)+ bv)
]
+
−Ca
Nv
∑
n=1
‖δvn‖0
(28)
is equivalent to the following sub-problem
max
δv∈Uv0
VaCl
Nv
∑
n=1
[
1− yvn(w
T
v xvn+ bv)
]
+
+VaClw
T
v δv−Ca ‖δv‖0 .
(29)
We adopt the similar proof in [34], recall the properties of
sublinear aggregated action set, U −v ⊆Uv ⊆U
+
v , where
U −
∆
=
n
∪
t=1
U
−
t ,U
−
t
∆
=
{
(δ1, ...,δn)
∣∣∣∣ δt ∈ U0;δi = 0, i 6= t.
}
;
U +
∆
=
(α1δ1, ...,αnδn)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
n
∑
i=1
αi = 1;αi ≥ 0,
δi ∈U0, i= 1, ...,n
.
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Hence, fixing any (wv,bv) ∈ R
p+1, we have the following
inequalities:
max
{δvn}∈U
−
v
S({δvn})≤ max
{δvn}∈Uv
S({δvn})≤ max
{δvn}∈U
+
v
S({δvn})
(30)
We can show that (29) is no larger than the leftmost term and
no smaller than the rightmost term [1]. Thus, the equivalence
between (28) and (29) holds. Hence, Lemma 2 holds.
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF LEMMA 3
We use best response dynamics to construct the best re-
sponse for the min-problem and max-problem separately. The
min-problem and max-problem are achieved by fixing {rv,ξv}
and {δv}, respectively. For fixed {r
∗
v ,ξ
∗
v },
δ ∗v ∈ argmax
{δv}
∑
v∈Va
(
VaClr
∗
v
T (Ip+1−Πp+1)δv−Ca‖δv‖0
)
s.t. δv ∈ Uv0, ∀v ∈ Va.
(31)
We relax l0 norm to l1 norm to represent the cost function
of the attacker. By writing the dual form of the l1 norm, we
arrive at
δ ∗v ∈ arg max
{δv,sv}
VaClr
∗
v
T (Ip+1−Πp+1)δv− 1
T sv
s.t.
Caδv ≤ sv,
Caδv ≥−sv,
δv ∈Uv0.
(32)
For fixed {δ ∗v }, we have
min
{rv,ωvu,ξv}
1
2 ∑
v∈V
rTv (Ip+1−Πp+1)rv
+VaCl ∑
v∈Va
rTv (Ip+1−Πp+1)δ
∗
v +VCl ∑
v∈V
1Tv ξv
s.t.
YvXvrv ≥ 1v− ξv, ∀v ∈ V ;
ξv ≥ 0v, ∀v ∈ V ;
rv = ωvu,ωvu = ru, ∀v ∈ V ,∀u ∈ Bu.
(33)
Note that term −Ca ‖δ
∗
v ‖0 is removed since it does not play
a role in the minimization problem. Based on (32) and (33),
we have the method of solving Problem (12) as follows, first
step is that we randomly pick initial {r
(0)
v ,δ
(0)
v }, and then we
solve Max-problem (32) with {r
(0)
v } to obtain {δ
(1)
v }. In next
step, we solve Min-problem (33) to obtain {r
(1)
v } with {δ
(1)
v }
from the previous step. We repeat solving the max-problem
with {r
(t−1)
v } and solving the min-problem with {δ
(t)
v } until
convergence. Furthermore, we use the alternating direction
method of multipliers (ADMoM) to solve Problem (33).
The ADMoM is a distributed optimization algorithm solving
the following problem:
min
r,ω
f (r)+ g(ω)
s.t. Mr= ω ,
(34)
where f and g are convex functions [35].
The augmented Lagrangian corresponding to (34) is
L(r,ω ,α) = f (r)+ g(ω)+αT (Mr−ω)+
η
2
‖Mr−ω‖2,
(35)
where α denotes the Lagrange multiplier.
Then, the ADMoM solves problem (34) by the update rules
below:
r(t+1) ∈ argmin
r
L(r,ω(t),α(t)); (36)
ω(t+1) ∈ argmin
ω
L(r(t+1),ω ,α(t)); (37)
α(t+1) = α(t)+η(Mr(t+1)−ω(t+1)). (38)
The objective here is to transform Problem (33) into the form
of (34), and then we can solve Problem (33) by iterations (36),
(37), and (38). We adopt a similar method in [8], which leads
to the following result.
Remark 1. Each node iterates λ
(t)
v ,r
(t)
v and α
(t)
v , given by
λ
(t+1)
v ∈ arg max
0≤λv≤VCl1v
− 1
2
λ Tv YvXvU
−1
v X
T
v Yvλv
+(1v+YvXvU
−1
v f
(t)
v )
T
λv,
(39)
r
(t+1)
v = U
−1
v
(
XTv Yvλ
(t+1)
v − f
(t)
v
)
, (40)
ω
(t+1)
vu =
1
2
(r
(t+1)
v + r
(t+1)
u ), (41)
α
(t+1)
v = α
(t)
v +
η
2
∑
u∈Bv
[
r
(t+1)
v − r
(t+1)
u
]
, (42)
where Uv = (Ip+1 − Πp+1) + 2η |Bv|Ip+1, f
(t)
v = VaClδ
∗
v +
2α
(t)
v − 2η ∑u∈Uv ω
(t)
vu . By combining the above remark with
Problem (32), we can obtain Lemma 3.
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